In this paper, we show how to construct -from any linear code -a Proof of Retrievability (PoR) which features very low computation complexity on both the client (Verifier) and the server (Prover) sides, as well as small client storage (typically 512 bits). We adapt the security model initiated by Juels and Kaliski Math. Cryptol. 7 (2013), no. 3, 183-216], from which our construction evolves. We thus provide a rigorous treatment of the security of our generic design; more precisely, we sharply bound the extraction failure of our protocol according to this security model. Next we instantiate our formal construction with codes built from tensor-products as well as with Reed-Muller codes and lifted codes, yielding PoRs with moderate communication complexity and (server) storage overhead, in addition to the aforementioned features.
Introduction

Motivation
Cloud computing and storage has evolved quite spectacularly over the past decade. Especially, data outsourcing allows users and companies to lighten their storage burden and maintenance cost. Though, it raises several issues: for example, how can someone check efficiently that he can retrieve without any loss a massive file that he had uploaded on a distant server and erased from his personal system? Proofs of retrievability (PoRs) address this issue. They are cryptographic protocols involving two parts: a client (or a verifier) and a server (or a prover). PoRs usually consist in the following phases. First, a key generation process creates secret material related to the file, meant to be kept by the client only. Then the file is initialised, that is, it is encoded and/or encrypted according to the secret data held by the client. This processed file is uploaded to the server. In order to check retrievability, the client can run a verification procedure, which is the core of the PoR. Finally, if the client is convinced that the server still holds his file, the client can proceed at any time to the extraction of the file.
Several parameters must be taken into account. Plainly, the verification process has to feature a low communication complexity, as the main goal is to avoid downloading a large part of the file to only check its extractability. Second, the storage overhead induced by the protocol must be low, as large server overhead would imply high fees for the customer. Third, the computation cost of the verification procedure must be low, both for the client (which is likely to own a lightweight device) and the server (whose computation work could also be expensive for the client).
Notice that proofs of data possession (PDP) represent protocols close to what is needed in PoRs. However, in PDPs, one does not require the client to be able to extract the file from the server. Instances of PDPs are given by Ateniese et al. [2] . Besides, protocols of Lillibridge et al. [8] and Naor and Rothblum [10] are very often seen as precursors for PoRs. For instance, the work of Naor and Rothblum [10] considers a setting in which the client directly accesses the file stored by the prover/server (while the actual PoR definition uses "an arbitrary program as opposed to a simple memory layout and this program may answer these questions in an arbitrary manner" [14] ).
Previous work
Juels and Kaliski [6] gave the first formal definition of PoRs. They also proposed a first construction based on so-called sentinels (namely, random parts of the file to be checked during the verification step) the client keeps secretly on his device. Additionally, an erasure code ensures the integrity of the file to be extracted. This seminal work also raised several interesting points. On the one hand, it revealed that (i) the client must store secret data to be used in the verification step and (ii) coding is needed in order to retrieve the file without erasures or errors. On the other hand, in Juels and Kaliski's construction, the verification step can only be performed a finite number of times since sentinels cannot be reused endlessly.
As a consequence, Shacham and Waters proposed to consider unbounded-use PoRs in [14] , where they built two kinds of PoRs. The first one is based on linear combinations of authenticators produced via pseudorandom functions; its security was proved using cryptographic tools such as unforgeable MAC scheme, semantically secure symmetric encryption and secure PRFs. The second one is a publicly verifiable scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear groups.
Bowers, Juels and Oprea [3] adopted a coding-theoretic approach (inner code, outer code) to compare variants of Shacham-Waters and Juels-Kaliski schemes. They focused on the efficiency of the schemes, and proved that, despite bounded use, new variants of Juels-Kaliski construction are highly competitive compared to other existing schemes.
In [11] , Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay provide a general framework for PoRs in the unconditional security model. They show that retrievability of the file can be expressed as error correction of a so-called response code. That allows them to precisely quantify the extraction success as a function of the success probability of a proving algorithm: indeed, in this setting, extraction can be naturally seen as nearest-neighbour decoding in the response code. They notably apply their framework to prove the security of a modified version of the Shacham-Waters scheme. Also, notice that, prior to [11] , Dodis, Vahan and Wichs [4] proposed another coding-theoretic model for PoRs that allowed them to build efficient bounded-use and unbounded-use PoR schemes.
With practicality in mind, other features have been deployed on PoRs. For instance, Wang et al. [15] presented a PoR construction based on Merkle hash trees, which allows efficient file updates on the server. Their scheme is provably secure under cryptographic assumptions (hardness of Diffie-Hellman in bilinear groups, unforgeable signatures, etc.) and has been improved by Mo, Zhou and Chen [9] in order to prevent unbalanced trees. More recently, other features have been proposed for PoRs, such as multi-prover PoRs (see [12] ) or public verifiability (for instance in [13] ).
Our approach
As we remarked before, most PoR schemes rely on two techniques: (i) the client locally stores secret data in order to check the integrity of the file, and (ii) the client encodes the file in order to repair a small number of erasures and errors that could have been missed during the verification step.
In this work, we propose to build PoR schemes using codes that fulfil the two previous goals, when equipped with a suitable family of efficiently computable random permutations. More precisely, our idea is the following. Given a file F, a code C and a family of random permutations σ K , the client sends to the server an encoded and scrambled version σ K (C(F)) of his file. Then the verification step consists in checking "short" relations among descrambled symbols of w = C(F), which come, for instance, from low-weight parity-check equations for C. Moreover, during the extraction step, the code C provides the redundancy necessary to repair erasures and potential unnoticed errors.
In the present work, we develop a seminal idea that appeared in [7] , where the authors proposed a construction of PoRs based on lifted codes. We here provide a more generic construction and give a deeper analysis of its security.
While our scheme does not feature updatability nor public verifiability, we emphasise the genericity of our construction, which is based on well-studied algebraic and combinatorial structures, namely, codes and their parity-check equations. Moreover, since the code C is public, the client must only store the secret material associated to the random permutations σ K , which consist in a few bytes. Besides, an honest server simply needs to read pieces of w during the verification step, and therefore has very low computational burden compared to many other PoR schemes.
Organisation
Section 2 is devoted to the definition and security model of proofs of retrievability. Despite the great disparity of models in PoR literature, we try to keep close to the definitions given in [6, 11] for the sake of uniformity.
Section 3 presents our construction of PoR. Precisely, in Section 3.1, we introduce objects called verification structures for a code C that will be used in the definition of our PoR scheme (Section 3.2). A rigorous analysis of our scheme is the purpose of the remainder of that section.
The performance of our generic construction is given in Section 4. We then provide several instances in Section 5, proving the practicality of our PoR schemes for some classes of codes.
Proofs of retrievability
Definition of underlying protocols
We recall that, in proofs of retrievability, a user wants to estimate if a message m can be retrieved from a encoded version w of the message stored on a server. In all what follows, the user will be known as the Verifier (wants to verify the retrievability of the message) while the server is the Prover (aims at proving the retrievability). The message space is denoted by M while W, the (server) file space, is the set of encoded versions of the messages. We also denote by K the set of secret values (or keys) kept by the Verifier, and by R the space of responses to challenges.
Throughout the paper, the symbols ← R and ← respectively denote the output of randomised and deterministic algorithms. (2) The initialisation algorithm Init is a deterministic algorithm which takes, as input, a message m ∈ M and a key κ ∈ K, and outputs a file w ∈ W. Init is run by the Verifier which initially holds the message m. After the process, the file w is sent to the Prover, and the message m is erased on Verifier's side. Upon receipt of w, the Prover sets a deterministic algorithm P (w) that will be run during the verification procedure. (3) The verification algorithm Verify is a randomised algorithm initiated by the Verifier which needs a secret key κ ∈ K and interacts with the Prover. Verify is depicted in Figure 1 and works as follows: (i) the Verifier runs a random query generator that outputs a challenge u ← R Q (the set Q being the so-called query set); (ii) the challenge u is sent to the Prover; (iii) the Prover outputs a response r u ← P (w) (u) ∈ R; (iv) the Verifier checks the validity of r u according to u and κ; the algorithm Verify finally outputs the Boolean value Check(u, r u , κ). (4) The extraction algorithm Extract is run by the Verifier. It takes, as input, κ and r = (r u : u ∈ Q) ∈ R Q and outputs either a message m ∈ M or a failure symbol ⊥. We say that extraction succeeds if Extract(r, κ) = m. The vector r = (r u ← P (w) (u)) u∈Q ∈ R Q is called the response word associated to P (w) .
Note that, in assuming that the response algorithm P (w) is deterministic and non-adaptive¹, we follow the work of Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay [11] . The authors justify determinism of response algorithms by the fact that any probabilistic prover can be replaced by a deterministic prover whose success probability is at least as good as the probabilistic one.
In Definition 2.1, we can see that a deterministic algorithm P (w) can be represented by the vector of its outputs r = (P (w) (u)) u∈Q , called the response word of P (w) . Therefore, we can assume that, before the verification step, the Prover produces a word r (w) ∈ R Q related to the file w he holds. In other words, we model provers as algorithms P which, given as input w, return a word r ∈ R Q . Following [11] , we also assume in this chapter that the extraction algorithm Extract is deterministic, though, in general, it can be randomised. Finally, notice that proofs of retrievability aim at proving the extractability of a file. The extraction algorithm is therefore a tool to retrieve the whole file. Hence its computational efficiency is not a crucial feature. Table 1 summarises the information held by each entity after the initialisation step. Table 2 reports the inputs and outputs of the algorithms involved in a PoR.
Security models
One should first notice that, despite many efforts, proofs of retrievability lack a general agreement on the definition of their security model. Nevertheless, our definitions remain very close to the ones given in the original work of Juels and Kaliski [6] .
For a response word r ∈ R Q given by the Prover and a key κ ∈ K kept by the Verifier, we first define the success of r according to κ as succ(r, κ) := Pr u (Check(u, r u , κ) = True), where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of Verify. A first security model can be defined as follows. 
1) the probability being taken over the internal randomness of KeyGen under the constraint that w = Init(m, κ).
A remark concerning parameters ε and τ. In proofs of retrievability, we aim at making the extraction of the desired file m as sure as possible when the audit succeeds. Hence it is desirable to have τ small. On the other hand, the parameter ε measures the rate of unsuccessful audits which leads the Verifier to believe the extraction will fail. Therefore, one does not necessarily need to look for large values of ε, though, in practice, large ε afford more flexibility, for instance, if communication errors occur between the Prover and the Verifier during the verification procedure. Definition 2.2 provides a strong security model, in the sense that (i) it does not require any bound on the response algorithms given by the Prover and (ii) the probability in (2.1) is taken over fixed messages m (informally, it means the Prover knows m).
However, keyed proofs of retrievability are usually insecure according to the security model given in Definition 2.2. For instance, in [11] , Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay noticed that in the Shacham-Waters scheme [14] , given the knowledge of m and w, an unbounded Prover may be able to (i) compute (or at least randomly guess) a key κ such that Init(m, κ) = w, 
In equation (2.2), the randomness comes from pairs (m, κ) ∈ M × K picked uniformly at random among those satisfying w = Init(m, κ).
Since we deal with values of τ very close to 0, we also say that a strongly (ε, τ)-sound PoR admits λ = − log 2 (τ) bits of security against ε-adversaries.
Informally, saying that a PoR is not weakly sound amounts to finding a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm P which • takes, as input, a file w ∈ W and outputs a response word r ∈ R Q , • makes the extraction fail with non-negligible probability (over messages m and keys κ such that the corresponding response words are successfully audited).
Our generic construction
Schematically, in the initialisation phase of our construction, the Verifier (i) encodes his file according to a code C, (ii) scrambles the resulting codeword using a tuple of permutations over the base field, (iii) uploads the result to the Prover. As we explained in the introduction, the verification step then consists in checking that the server is still able to give answers that, once descrambled, satisfy low-weight parity-check equations for C.
For this purpose, we next introduce objects called verification structures for codes, which will be used in the definition of our generic PoR scheme.
Verification structures: A tool for our PoR scheme
We here consider q , the finite field with q elements. From well-known coding theory terminology, the support of a word w ∈ n q is supp(w) := {i ∈ [1, n], w i ̸ = 0}, and its weight is wt(w) := |supp(w)|.
In this work, we need to consider codes whose alphabets are finite-dimensional spaces R over q , typically R = s q . Precisely, a code C of length n over R is a subset of R n . A code C ⊆ R n is q -linear if C is a vector space over q . When R = q , we get the usual definition of linear codes over finite fields. Unless stated otherwise, we only consider q -linear codes, that we will refer to as codes.
We usually denote by k the dimension over q of a code C. Its minimum distance d min (C) is the smallest Hamming distance between two distinct codewords. If n is the length of C, then d min (C)/n ∈ [0, 1] is the relative minimum distance of the code C, while k/n represents its rate.
Definition 3.1 (Verification structure). Let 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n and C ⊆ n q be a code. Let also Q be a non-empty set of ℓ-subsets of [1, n] . Set R = ℓ q . We define the restriction map R associated to Q as
Given an integer s ≥ 1 and a map V : Q × R → s q , we say that (Q, V) is a verification structure for C if the following holds:
) is surjective and vanishes on the code C. Explicitly,
The map V is then called a verification map for C, and the set Q a query set for C. By convention, for w ∈ n q and r ∈ R Q , we define
Finally, the code R(C) := {R(c), c ∈ C} is called the response code of C.
Hamming weight ℓ, whose supports are pairwise distinct. Define the query set Q = {supp(h), h ∈ H} and, for any u ∈ Q, h(u) to be the unique parity-check equation in H whose support is u. Finally, we define a map V by
Notice that we set s = 1 here. By construction, it is clear that (Q, V) is a verification structure for C. ) . According to Example 3.2, we define Q to be the set of supports of rows of H. In other words,
is indexed according to u, then we define
Hence the word r = R(c)
For each vector-coordinate b ∈ 3 2 of r = R(c), one can now check that ∑ j b j = 0. Hence we get V(R(c)) = 0, as expected.
From now on, we denote by N = |Q| the length of the response code R(C) of a code C equipped with a verification structure (Q, V).
The code C and the verification structure (Q, V) for C are public parameters. We assume that C is linear and set N = |Q|. We recall that R = ℓ q and W = n q . Key generation: The Verifier generates uniformly at random an n-tuple of permutations
n .
Initialisation:
The Verifier first encodes his file m ∈ k q into a codeword c ∈ C with a systematic encoding algorithm for C. Then the Verifier scrambles each coordinate c i using the permutation σ i :
Finally, w ∈ W is sent to the Prover, and m is erased by the Verifier. To sum up, the deterministic algorithm Init is defined by
Based on his knowledge of w and public parameters, the Prover produces a word r ← P(w), r ∈ R Q , which corresponds to the vector of outputs of the deterministic proving algorithm P on input w. Verification: (i) The Verifier picks uniformly at random u = (u 1 , . . . , u ℓ ) ← R Q. Then the Verifier sends u to the Prover, meaning the Prover is asked to send back R(u, w) = w |u ∈ ℓ q to the Verifier. (ii) The Prover sends back the u-th coordinate r u ∈ R of his response word r to the Verifier. (iii) On input r u ∈ R, the Verifier runs V σ (u, r u ) and outputs the result. Here we mean that:
False otherwise.
Extraction:
The Verifier first collects r = (P(w) u : u ∈ Q) ∈ R Q . Then he runs the extraction procedure given in Figure 3 , on input σ and r, and he outputs his result. 
Definition of our PoR scheme
Let (Q, V) be a verification structure for C ⊆ n q , and let σ ∈ S( q ) n , where S( q ) denotes the set of permutations over q . Any n-tuple of permutations σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ S( q ) n naturally acts on c ∈ n q by
and we define σ(C) = {σ(c), c ∈ C}. Let finally
The map V σ has been defined in order to satisfy
Based on this, our PoR construction is given in Figure 2 .
Analysis
Preliminary results
We first give results concerning verification structures and response codes. The following two lemmata are straightforward to prove. Remark 3.6. By considering σ(C) instead of C, we loose the q -linearity, but one can check that verification structures still make sense and provide the result claimed in Lemma 3.4.
The next result states that the map C → σ(C) does not modify the distance between codewords.
Lemma 3.7. Let C ⊆ n q be a linear code, (Q, V) a verification structure for C, and σ ∈ S( q ) n .
Then it holds that • the distribution of distances in C and σ(C) are the same, • the distribution of distances in R(C) and R(σ(C)) are the same.
Proof. Since every σ i is one-to-one, for any c, c ∈ C, we get
The proof for response codes relies on the same argument.
Remark these results imply that, if C is linear, then the minimum distance of R(σ(C)) is the minimum weight of R(C).
Definition 3.8. Let ε ∈ [0, 1] and (Q, V) be a verification structure for a code C ⊆ n q . We say r ∈ R Q is ε-close
Let now c ∈ C and β ∈ [0, 1]. We say that r ∈ R Q is a β-liar for (Q, V, c) if
Bounded-distance error-and-erasure decoder. Let A ⊆ n q be any code of minimum distance d, and let a ∈ A be corrupted with b errors and e erasures, resulting in a word r ∈ ( q ∪ {⊥}) n . Then it is well known that, as long as 2b + e < d, it is possible to retrieve a from r thanks to a so-called bounded-distance error-and-erasure decoding algorithm. This is precisely the decoding algorithm that we employ in Figure 3 on the code A = R(C).
Our framework allows us to reformulate the extraction success in terms of a probability to decode corrupted codewords. More precisely: Proof. Recall that r ∈ (R ∪ {⊥}) Q represents the word we get from r after step (ii) of the algorithm given in Figure 3 . Let us now translate our assumptions on r in coding-theoretic terminology:
• r is ε-close to (Q, V σ ) means that there are at most εN challenges u ∈ Q for which we know that the coordinate r u is not authentic. This justifies that we assign erasure symbols to these coordinates.
• r is a β-liar for (Q, V, c) means that there are at most βN other corrupted values r u , but we cannot identify them. Therefore, we can assimilate these coordinates to errors. To sum up, we see r as a corruption of R(C(m)) with at most εN erasures and at most βN errors, where N = |Q|. Since we assume that (ε + 2β)N < d, we know from the previous discussion that the decoding succeeds to retrieve m.
Bounding the extraction failure
According to Definition 2.3, our PoR scheme is weakly (ε, τ)-sound if, for every polynomial-time algorithm P outputting a response word r (w) from a file w, we have
into m fails
Using Proposition 3.9, the security analysis of our PoR scheme reduces to measuring the ability of the Prover to produce a response word r which is ε-close to (Q, V σ ) and a β-liar for (Q, V σ , w),
, σ ∈ S( q ) n and w = σ(C(m)) the authentic file given to the prover, we define three subsets of Q:
. This represents challenges u on which the response word r differs from the authentic one R(w).
. These are challenges u on which the associated coordinate r u is not accepted by the verification map (it corresponds to erasures in the decoding process).
• B(r, σ, w) := {u ∈ Q, r u ̸ = R(w) u and V σ (u, r u ) = 0} and B(r, σ, m) := |B(r, σ, m)|. These are the challenges u on which the associated coordinate r u is accepted by the verification map, but differs from the authentic response s u (it corresponds to errors in the decoding process). One can easily check that, for every σ, the sets E(r, σ) and B(r, σ, w) define a partition of D(r, w). The probability of extraction failure can thus be written as Pr (
For w ∈ n q , let us define the set of admissible permutations and messages
Later on, we will use the notation Pr Φ w to refer to the fact that (σ, m) is uniformly drawn from Φ w . Similarly we will use notation Φ w for the expectancy and Var Φ w for the variance. Given r ∈ R Q , we also define
and α := max (r,w) α(r, w), where (r, w) are such that D(r, w) ̸ = 0. The parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is called the bias of the verification structure (Q, V) for C. It corresponds to the maximum probability that a response is accepted but not authentic.
Lemma 3.10.
For all r ∈ R Q and w ∈ n q , we have
Proof. A simple computation shows
(1 − α)
Lemma 3.10 essentially means that, if an adversary to our PoR scheme wants its response word to be (in average) ε-close to the verification structure, then he should modify at most D(r, w) ≤ εN 1−α responses. Below, we take advantage of this result, and we measure the probability of an extraction failure.
First, for δ, ε ∈ (0, 1), let
The probability p(r, w; ε, δ) represents the probability that the extraction fails for a response code of relative distance δ and an adversarial response word r associated to w, which is ε-close to the verification structure. Let us bound p(r, w; ε, δ). Proposition 3.11. Let δ, ε ∈ (0, 1) such that δ 1−α 1+α > ε. Let also r ∈ R Q and w ∈ n q . Then we have
Proof. We distinguish three cases. (
Hence, using Chebychev's inequality,
Therefore, similarly to the previous case, we obtain the claimed result.
For any u ∈ D(r, w), denote by X u the {0, 1}-random variable " V σ (u,r u )=0 " when σ is uniformly drawn from Φ w . It holds that E(r, σ) = ∑ u∈D(r,w) (1 − X u ).
Recall that two real random variables Y, Z are uncorrelated if (YZ) = (Y) (Z). For instance, two independent random variables are uncorrelated. 
Proof. By assumption, {X u } u∈D(r,w) are pairwise uncorrelated; hence
The trivial bound Var Φ w (1 − X u ) ≤ 1 gives the result.
As a corollary of Proposition 3.11 and Lemma 3.12, under the same hypothesis and assuming Therefore, we end up with the following theorem. 
For asymptotically small α, a code C equipped with a verification structure satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.13 thus gives an (ε, τ)-sound PoR scheme for every ε < (1 + o(1))δ and τ = O(1/N).
According to Theorem 3.13, we thus need to look for (sequences of) codes C and associated verification structures (Q, V) such that (i) the response code R(C) admits a good relative distance δ = d min (R(C))/N, (ii) the bias α is small, (iii) random variables {X u } u∈D(r,w) are pairwise uncorrelated. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 characterise conditions under which the last two points are fulfilled. Then, in Section 5, we discuss which response codes can achieve good relative distance.
Estimating α
In this section, we prove that, assuming Φ w approximates the uniform distribution over S( q ) n in a sense that we make precise later, the bias α can be bounded according to parameters of the verification structure.
Let us fix r ∈ R Q , w ∈ n q and u ∈ Q. We recall that α is defined by
where randomness comes from σ
We notice that this is equivalent to write σ ← R {σ ∈ S( q ) n , σ −1 (w) ∈ C}. For convenience, we will view r u ∈ R = ℓ q as a vector indexed by u = (u 1 , . . . , u ℓ ), so that we can easily denote by r u [u j ] ∈ q its j-th coordinate, 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ. We define the code K u := ker V(u, ⋅ ) ⊆ ℓ q , and up to reindexing coordinates, C |u ⊆ K u . This allows us to write that, for every σ, we have V σ (u, r u ) = 0 if and only if σ −1 u (r u ) ∈ K u . Finally, we denote by
Informally, the reason why we consider an event Y u (σ) conditioned by supp(σ −1 u (r u )) = Z u is that the Prover is free to choose any support Z u on which he can modify the original file. More formally, this constraint will help us to bound the probability Pr Φ w (V σ (u, r u ) = 0) in Lemma 3.14. We say that Φ w is sufficiently uniform if, for every u ∈ Q, we have
when the file size n log q → ∞. In other words, Φ w is sufficiently uniform if it is a good approximation of the whole set of n-tuples of permutations, when considering the probability that Y u (σ) happens.
Lemma 3.14. Let r, w, u and Z u be defined as above. Let also
Proof. For every σ such that (σ, m) ∈ Φ w , we know that σ −1 u (R(w) u ) ∈ K u , and we recall that V σ (u, r u ) = 0 if and only if σ −1 u (r u ) ∈ K u . Since K u is linear, and up to considering σ −1 u (R(w) u − r u ) instead, we can assume without loss of generality that σ −1 u (r u )[i] = 0 for every i ∈ u \ Z u . In other words, we assume that
since A u counts the number of codewords in K u whose support is Z u .
Therefore, we get
Lemma 3.15. Let S u be the q -vector space ⟨{x ∈ K u , supp(x) = Z u }⟩, and assume that S u ̸ = {0}. We have
.
Proof. We prove that, if A u > q e for some integer e ≥ 0, then d min (S u ) ≤ |Z u | − e, which clearly induces our result. If A u > q e , then dim S u > e since |S u | ≥ A u . The Singleton bound then provides
Finally, we get the following upper bound on α.
, where γ u = max γ u .
Proof. Remark that S u , defined in previous lemma, is a subcode of K u shortened on u \ Z u . Hence
and we can apply previous results and obtain the desired bound
, where γ = max u γ u .
If every Φ w is sufficiently uniform, then, by definition, we have γ = o(1) when the file size n log q → ∞. This assumption is significant since we desire to have a small bias α, which is deeply linked to the soundness of PoRs (see Theorem 3.13). In Appendix A, we present experimental estimates of α, validating that the assumption that Φ w is sufficiently uniform.
Pairwise uncorrelation of {X u } u∈D
This section is devoted to proving that variables {X u } u∈D(r,w) are pairwise uncorrelated if the supports of challenges u ∈ D(r, w) have small pairwise intersection. For this purpose, let us recall that, for fixed r ∈ R Q , w and u ∈ D(r, w), the random variable X u represents V σ (u,r u )=0 when σ is uniformly picked in Φ w .
We first state a technical lemma that will be useful to prove Proposition 3.18 below. For clarity, we denote by d ⊥ (C) the minimum distance of the dual code C ⊥ of a linear code C.
Lemma 3.17. Let C ⊆ n q be a linear code and T ⊂ [1, n], |T| = t, where t < d ⊥ (C). For a ∈ T q , we define
V a = {c ∈ C, c |T = a} and N a = |V a |.
Proof. (i) The fact that V 0 = {v ∈ X q , v |T = 0} is actually the well-known definition of the shortening of a code. It is easy to prove that it defines a linear code.
(ii) Let a ∈ T q be non-zero, and let us first prove that there exists c (a) ∈ C such that c (a) |T = a. If it were not the case, then, by definition, we would have C |T ̸ = t q . But this is impossible since C ⊥ contains no non-zero codeword of weight less that t. It is then easy to check that
we get the expected result. Proof. Recall that K u := ker V(u, ⋅ ) and that, by definition of a verification structure, we have
Denote t = |u ∩ v|, and let (a, b) ∈ ( t q ) 2 . We denote by Z(σ, a, b ) the event
We first notice that {σ
Indeed, we can here use an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.17: the constraint σ −1 (w) ∈ C is ineffective on σ
, and it follows that a, b) ).
Hence, for fixed a and b, the variables
are independent (once again, it is a consequence of the structure results of Lemma 3.17). Therefore,
and we conclude since
Performance
Efficient scrambling of the encoded file
In the PoR scheme we propose, the storage cost of an n-tuple of permutations in S( q ) n is excessive since it is superlinear in the original file size. In this subsection, we propose a storage-efficient way to scramble the codeword c ∈ C produced by the Verifier.
Precisely, we want to define a family of maps (σ (κ) ) κ , where σ (κ) : C → n q , c → w ∈ n q , with the following requirements:
• For every κ, the map σ (κ) is efficiently computable and requires a low storage.
• For every κ and every c ∈ C, if w = σ (κ) (c), then, for every i ∈ [1, n] , the local inverse map w i → c i is efficiently computable.
• If κ is randomly generated but unknown, then, given the knowledge of w = σ (κ) (c) and C, it is hard to produce a response word r ∈ R Q such that, for many u ∈ Q, both V σ (κ) (u, r u ) = 0 and r u ̸ = w |u hold. To be more specific and in light of the security analysis of Section 3.3, we require that it is hard to distinguish σ (κ) (c) from a random (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ n q , where symbols z i are picked independently and uniformly at random. We here propose to derive σ (κ) from a suitable block cipher, yielding the explicit construction given below. Of course, other proposals can be envisioned.
The construction. Let IV denote a random initialisation vector for AES in CTR mode (IV could be a nonce concatenated with a random value). Vector IV is kept secret by the Verifier, as well as a randomly chosen key κ for the cipher. Let also f be a permutation polynomial over q of degree d > 1. For instance, one could choose f(x) = x d with gcd(d, q − 1) = 1. Notice that polynomial f can be made public. Let s = ⌊ 256 ⌈log 2 q⌉ ⌋ be the number of q -symbols one can store in a 256-bit word². Up to appending a few random bits to c, we assume that s | n, and we define t = n/s. Let us fix a partition of [1, n] into s-tuples i = (i 1 , . . . , i s ); it can be, for instance, (1, . . . , s), (s + 1, . . . , 2t) , . . . , ((t − 1)s + 1, . . . , n). Notice that this partition does not need to be chosen at random. Given c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C and i an element of the above partition, we now define
If log 2 q ∤ 256, trailing zeroes can be added to evaluations of f . Finally, the pseudo-random permutation σ is defined by σ(c) := (b 1 , . . . , b t ). Design rationale. AES is a natural choice when one needs a (secret-)keyed pseudo-random permutation. Also notice that, with this construction, one only needs to store the key κ and the vector IV since the other objects (the polynomial f , the partition) are made public. Hence our objectives in terms of storage are met.
We now point out the necessity to use i as a part of the input of the AES cipher. Assume that we do not. Then the local permutation σ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, would not depend on j. As a consequence, for a certain class of codes, the local verification map r u → V σ (u, r u ) would not depend on u, and a malicious Prover would then be able to produce accepted answers while storing only a small piece of the file w (e.g., w |u for only one u ∈ Q).
Another mandatory feature is the non-linearity of the permutation polynomial f . Indeed, assume, for instance, that f = id. Then, given the knowledge of w = σ(c), it would be very easy for a malicious Prover to produce a word w ̸ = w such that r = R(w ) is always accepted by the Verifier. Simply, the Prover defines w = w + c , where c is any non-zero codeword of C. Hence one sees that the polynomial f must be non-linear in order to prevent such kind of attacks.
Parameters
We here consider a PoR built upon a code C ⊆ n q with verification structure (Q, V) satisfying R = ℓ q and V(R) = s q . We also assume that we use an n-tuple of pseudo-random permutations as described in the previous subsection.
Communication complexity. At each verification step, the client sends an ℓ-tuple of coordinates (u 1 , . . . , u ℓ ), u i ∈ [1, n] . The server then answers with corresponding symbols w u i ∈ q . Therefore, the upload communication cost is ℓ log 2 n bits, while the download communication cost is ℓ log 2 q, thus a total of ℓ(log 2 n + log 2 q) bits.
Computation complexity. In the initialisation phase, following the encryption described in Section 4.1, the client essentially has • to compute the codeword c ∈ C associated to its message, • to make n evaluations of the permutation polynomial f over q , • to compute t = n log 2 q 256 AES ciphertexts to produce the word w to be sent to the server. Given a generator matrix of C, the codeword c can be computed in O(kn) operations over q with a matrixvector product. Notice that quasi-linear-time encoding algorithms exist for some classes of codes. Besides, if a monomial or a sparse permutation polynomial is used, then the cost of each evaluation is O((log 2 q) 3 ). If we denote by c the bitcost of an AES encryption, we get a total bitcost of O(nk(log 2 q) 2 + n(log 2 q) 3 + cn log 2 q) for the initialisation phase. Recall this is a worst-case scenario in which the encoding process is inefficient.
Client storage 512 bits Server total storage n log 2 q bits Communication complexity (verif.) ℓ log 2 (nq) bits Client computation complexity (verif.) ℓ decryptions, ℓs operations over q Server computation complexity (verif.) ℓ reads, no computation Figure 4 : Summary of parameters of our PoR construction for an original file of size k log 2 q bits and a code C of dimension k over q equipped with a verification structure (Q, V) such that |u| = ℓ and rank V(u, ⋅ ) ≤ s for all u ∈ Q.
At each verification step, an honest server only needs to read ℓ symbols from the file it stores. Hence its computation complexity is O(ℓ). The client has to compute a matrix-vector product over q , where the matrix has size s × ℓ and the vector has size ℓ, thus a computation cost of O(ℓs) operations over q .
Storage needs. The client stores 2 × 256 bits for secret material κ and IV to use in AES. The server storage overhead exactly corresponds to the redundancy of the linear code C, that is, (n − dim C) log 2 q bits. Other features. Our PoR scheme is unbounded-use since every challenge reveals nothing about the secret data held by the client. It does not feature dynamic updates of files. Though, we must emphasise that the file w the client produces can be split among several servers, and the verification step remains possible even if the servers do not communicate with each other. Indeed, computing a response to a challenge does not require mixing distinct symbols w i of the uploaded file. Therefore, our scheme is well suited for the storage of large static distributed databases. Parameters of the PoR schemes we propose are reported in Figure 4 .
Instantiations
In this section, we present several instantiations of our PoR construction. We first recall basics and notation from coding theory.
The code Rep(ℓ) ⊆ ℓ q denotes the repetition code ⟨(1, . . . , 1)⟩. We recall that Rep(ℓ) ⊥ is the parity code
Their tensor product C ⊗ C is the q -linear code generated by words
It has dimension kk and minimum distance dd . We also denote by
the s-fold tensor product of C with itself.
Tensor-product codes
The upcoming subsection illustrates our construction with a non practical but simple instance. The next ones lead to practical PoR instances.
A simple but non-practical instance
Let n = Nℓ and Q = {u i = {iℓ + 1, iℓ + 2, . . . ,
We define the code
In other words, C = Par(ℓ) ⊗ N q , and a parity-check matrix H for C is given by
By construction (see the fundamental Example 3.2), the pair (Q, V) defines a verification structure for C. Proof. We see that the restriction map R sends the codeword (1, −1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ C to a word of weight 1.
when N goes to infinity, an attempt to build a PoR scheme from C cannot be practical.
Higher order tensor-product codes
q -linear code, and define C = A ⊗s ⊆ n q , where n = ℓ s . Notice that it will be more convenient to see coordinates of words w ∈ n q as elements of
, the "i-th axis-parallel line with basis a", as
By definition of C, a word c lies in C if and only if, for every L = L i,a , the restriction c |L ∈ A. This means that we can define
where H is a parity-check matrix for A whose columns are ordered according to the line L. By the previous discussion, it is clear that c ∈ C implies that V(L, c |L ) = 0 for every L ∈ Q (in fact, these two assertions are equivalent). Hence (Q, V) defines a verification structure for C, and we have N = |Q| = sℓ s−1 .
Lemma 5.2. Let C = A ⊗s as above. Then R(C) has minimum distance s ⋅ d s−1
A .
Proof. Let us first prove that the minimum distance of R(C) is larger than s
Very informally, the set S i,x corresponds to the hyperplane passing through x and "orthogonal" to the i-th axis. By definition of C = A ⊗s , we know that c |S i,x ∈ A ⊗(s−1) \ {0} for every 1 ≤ i ≤ s. Let
Let us now build a word r ∈ R(C) of weight s(d A ) s−1 . Let w ∈ A \ {0} be a minimum-weight codeword of A, and define W := supp(w) ⊆ A. Define c = w ⊗s ∈ C; then supp(c) = W s . Let finally r = R(c). We see that r L i,x ̸ = 0 if and only if x ∈ W s . Hence we get 
allows us to apply Proposition 3.18. Besides, if every Φ w is sufficiently uniform, then the bias α satisfies α = O(q −δℓ+1 ) and hence 1−α 1+α = 1 + O(q −δℓ+1 ). Therefore, we can use Theorem 3.13, and we get the desired result.
Parameters. We mainly focus on the download communication complexity in the verification step and on the server storage overhead since these are the most crucial parameters which depend on the family of codes C we use. Besides, we consider that it is more relevant to analyse the ratio between these quantities and the file size than their absolute values.
Here, for an initial file of size |F| = ((1 − δ)q + 1) s log 2 q bits, we get • a redundancy rate n log 2 q |F| = (
Example 5.4. In Table 3 , we present various parameters of PoR instances admitting 0.10 ≤ ε 0 ≤ 0.16, for files of size approaching 10 4 , 10 6 and 10 9 bits. Here A is a [q, (1 − δ)q + 1, δq] q MDS code (e.g., a Reed-Solomon code), and C = A ⊗s .
The previous example shows that, while the communication rate is reasonable for these PoR instances over large files, the storage needs remain large. 
Reed-Muller and related codes
Low-degree Reed-Muller codes are known to admit many distinct low-weight parity-check equations, whose supports correspond to affine subspaces of the ambient space. Therefore, they seem naturally adapted to our construction. Let us first consider the plane (or bivariate) Reed-Muller code case.
The plane Reed-Muller code RM q (2, q − 2)
Let C be the Reed-Muller code
It is well known that C has length q 2 and dimension (q − 1)(q − 2)/2. Besides, for every line
and every c ∈ C, we can check that
The restriction of f on an affine line L can be interpolated as a univariate polynomial f |L of degree at most a. Our claim follows since ∑ z∈ q z i = 0 for every i ≤ q − 2.
Therefore, we can define Q as the set of affine lines L of 2 q and V(L, r) = ∑ ℓ j=1 r j ∈ q . From the previous discussion, we see that (Q, V) is a verification structure for C. Also notice there are q(q + 1) distinct affine lines in 2 q ; hence N = q(q + 1).
, equipped with its verification structure defined as above. Then the response code R(C) has minimum distance q 2 + 2.
Proof. Any non-zero codeword c ∈ C consists in the evaluation of a non-zero polynomial
of degree at most q − 2. Denote by L 1 , . . . , L a ⊂ 2 q the affine lines on which f vanishes, i.e., f(P) = 0 for every P ∈ L i , 1 ≤ i ≤ a. We claim that a ≤ q − 2. Indeed, since f has total degree less than q − 1, it also vanishes on closed lines 
and L (1) be two distinct parallel affine lines, respectively defined by X = 0 and X = 1. We build the word c which is −1 on coordinates corresponding to points in L (0) , 1 on those corresponding to points in L (1) and 0 elsewhere. One can check that c ∈ C; indeed, c corresponds to the evaluation of ∏ z∈ q \{0,1} (z − X). Now, if we want to compute wt(R(c)), we only need to count the number of lines which do not intersect L (0) nor L (1) . Clearly, there are only q − 2 such lines. Hence wt(R(c)) = q(q + 1) − (q − 2), and this concludes the proof. 
Besides, the relative distance of R(C) is
q(q+1) → 1 according to Lemma 5.5. If every Φ w is sufficiently uniform, the bias α satisfies α ∈ O(1/q) and hence 1−α 1+α = 1 + O(1/q). Therefore, we can use Theorem 3.13, and we get the desired result.
Parameters.
For an initial file of size |F| = 1 2 (q − 1)(q − 2) log 2 q bits, we get • a redundancy rate
• a communication complexity rate q log 2 q |F| = 2 q
Storage improvements via lifted codes
The redundancy rate of Reed-Muller codes presented above stays stuck above 2. Affine lifted codes, introduced by Guo, Kopparty and Sudan [5] , allow to break this barrier while keeping the same verification structure. Generically, they are defined as follows:
We refer to [5] for more details about the construction. Here we focus on Lift(2, q − 2) since it can be compared to RM(2, q − 2). Indeed, one sees that Proof. The rationale is similar to the proof of Lemma 5. 
We believe the bound given in Lemma 5.7 is not tight, but it is sufficient to have d min (R(Lift(2, q − 2)))/N → 1. Similarly to Proposition 5.6, we can then prove that practical PoRs can be constructed with the family of lifted codes Lift(2, q − 2). Proposition 5.8. Let C = Lift(2, q − 2), and let (Q, V) be its associated verification structure. If every Φ w is sufficiently uniform, then the PoR scheme associated to C and (Q, V) is (ε, τ)-sound for every ε < 1 and
The crucial improvement is that lifted codes potentially have much higher dimension than Reed-Muller codes. For q = 2 e , the dimension of Lift(2, q − 2) can be proved to equal 4 e − 3 e [5] .
Example 5.9. In Table 4 , we present parameters of PoRs based on Reed-Muller codes and lifted codes, using files of size approaching 10 4 , 10 6 and 10 9 bits.
Note that this family of codes has been used in the PoR proposal of [7] .
On more generic families of codes
We have presented two rather small families of codes producing practical instances of PoR. Let us give a short summary of approximate lower bounds on crucial PoR parameters that have been shown in previous sections in Table 5 . Now we quickly mention other families of codes that could be interesting to consider. Multi-variate generalisation. We have only presented Reed-Muller and lifted codes embedded into the affine plane 2 q . One could of course consider a broader ambient space m q , m > 2. Lines would have smaller relative weight compared to the ambient space, and thus we would decrease the communication complexity of our PoR schemes. We must however care about the storage overhead which can drastically increase if m gets large: for instance, any Reed-Muller code RM q (m, q − 2) has rate ≤ 1/m!.
Lower degree generalisation. In order to increase the soundness of our PoR schemes, one could consider Reed-Muller codes RM q (2, d) (as well as related lifted codes) with a lower degree d < q − 2. The communication complexity remains unchanged; however, we could observe overwhelming storage overhead if d is too small.
Combinatorial generalisation.
Codes Lift(2, q − 2) can be viewed as codes from designs (see [1] for more details), where the underlying block design is the classical affine plane. Considering designs with smaller block size would lead to PoRs with smaller communication complexity. But once again, this could be expensive in terms of storage since only a few designs produce high-dimensional codes.
Conclusion
We have proposed a security model for PoRs in line of previous work, together with a generic code-based framework. We have then sharply quantified the extraction failure of our PoR construction as a function of code parameters. Specialising this construction for particular families of codes, we provided instances with practical parameters. We hope our work will be an incentive for further proposals of code instances, aiming at better PoR parameters.
A Experimental estimate of the bias α
We here confirm our heuristic on the fact that Φ w is sufficiently uniform, by providing experimental estimates of α.
Setup. We consider PoR schemes using Reed-Muller codes C = RM q (2, q − 2), as presented in Section 5.2.1.
We also fix the word w ∈ n q uploaded on the server during the initialisation step. Remark that, for varying w, all Φ w are equivalently distributed. Indeed, if ψ ∈ S( q ) n satisfies ψ(w) = w , then the distribution of permutations picked from Φ w can be obtained by applying ψ to permutations picked from Φ w . Hence, without loss of generality, we assume w = 0. Proposition 3.16 claims that, in this context, α should be O(1/q) since ∆ = 2 and ℓ ≤ q. For convenience, we write p Φ := ℙ Φ w (V σ (u, r u ) = 0), and we recall that α is an upper bound on p Φ (for varying u and r).
We proceed to three kinds of tests in order to estimate α: • Test 1. We sample N challenges u, and, for each sample, we fix t ≤ ℓ and r u in {x ∈ ℓ q , |Z u | = t}. that, for fixed N and q and for any test i we use, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, our estimator ξ M (p Φ ) converges to a value close to 1/(q − 1).
Influence of N on the estimator. Table 6 shows experimentally that, for M large enough and fixed q, the number N has few influence on the estimator (N being respectively the number of responses r u sampled in test 2, and the number of challenges u sampled in test 1). The minor increase of the values can be thought as a standard deviation due to the fact that the number of samples M = 100,000 is finite. Table 7 : Estimators using test 3 with M = 1,000,000 and t = 2 for various values of prime powers q. The quantity 1/(q − 1) represents an estimated upper bound on α that ξ M (p Φ ) should approximate.
Influence of q on the estimator. In Table 7 , we show that the estimator ξ M (p Φ ) converges to an expected value 1/(q − 1) for any value of q.
